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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MARK LESLIE LARSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
CASE NO. 15408 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court upon an information alleging a violation of the provi-
sions of the Utah Criminal Code, § 76-5-207 in that " .•. on or 
about the 19th day of June, A.D., 1976, at Utah County, State 
of Utah, the said Mark Leslie Larsen, while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, to a degree rendering him incapable of 
safely driving a motor vehicle, did while operating a motor 
vehicle in a negligent manner, cause the death of Baby Mlejnek." 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to a jury, the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorensen, District Judge, presiding. A verdict of guilty was 
returned by the jury. Defendant was sentenced to serve an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
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Execution of the sentence was stayed and defendant placed 
on probation upon the condition that he serve six (6) months 
in the Utah County Jail and pay a fine of $1,000.00. Defendant 
was represented at trial by Richard 11. Taylor, Attorney at Law, 
who withdrew following the conclusion of the proceedings. 
dant's present counsel has been appointed by the Utah State 
Supreme Court to pursue this matter on appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
De fen-
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction or failing that, 
a new trial. 
STATE!1ENT OF THE FACTS 
Evidence presented at trial by the State indicated that the 
defendant was being pursued by a sheriff's deputy on I-15 south-
bound in Utah County at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour, 
(R.ll), and that the defendant's vehicle and another containing 
Andrew Mlejnek, his wife Sandra, and their two children apparently 
collided (R.l2). There were injuries to the four occupants of the 
Mlejnek vehicle but no fatalities (R.25). At the time of the 
accident, Sandra Mlejnek was in her 26th week of pregnancy (R.67). 
Sandra Mlejnek testified that she felt movement of the fetus on 
the day the accident occured, but not after the accident (R.36,37• 
Dr. Lynn Dayton, a certified synapsatrician gynecologist, 
testified that on the 19th day of June, 1976, he examined Sandra 
Mlejnek to determine whether or not the fetus was alive (R.66). 
During that examination, he was unable to detect any heart tones 
or other fetal activity. A few days later, labor ~as induced 
and Mrs. Mlejnek delivered a stillborn fetus wPiqhing approximate 
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one and one-half pounds. Dr. Dayton further testified that in 
his opinion, a traumatic blow could have been the cause of 
death of the infant, and that based on the statement of Sandra 
Mlejnek that the fetus was viable up to the time of the accident. 
(R. 70). 
Dr. Dayton also testified that the word "viable" means that 
the baby was alive within the mother (R.70). He further testi-
fied that a fetus of the size delivered by Mrs. Mlejnek would 
have approximately a 25 percent chance of survival outside the 
uterus (R.72). 
A breathalizer test conducted on defendant indicated his 
blood alcohol level to be .13 at the time it was taken (R. 55). 
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved to 
dismiss on the grounds that the State had failed to prove a 
prima facie case since a fetus was not "another" as used in the 
statute under which defendant was charged (R.74). The trial 
court denied defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R.78). 
The defendant took exception to Instruction No. 5 and Inst-
ruction No. 11. (R.79). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT cmtHIT THE CRU\E CHARGED IN THE INFORHA-
TION SINCE A VIABLE FETUS IS NOT "ANOTHER" AS USED IN UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1953) SECTION 76-5-207. 
Utah has abolished common law crimes, therefore only acts 
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"CamDn law crimes are abolished and no conduct 
is a cri..rre unless made so by this code, other 
applicable statute or ordinance." 
The Utah State Legislature has not included unborn fetuses 
within the class of those who may be victims of a crime. 
Code Annotated (1953) Section 76-5-207 (l) provides: 
"Criminal hcxnicide constitutes aut0110bile homicide 
if the actor, while under the influence of intoxi-
eating liquor, a controlled substance, or any drug, 
to a degree which renders the actor incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another 
by operating a motor vehicle in a negligent manner." 
(Emphasis added) 
Utah 
The word "another" used in the statute is used in reference 
to the word "actor" used in the preceeding portion of the statute. 
U.C.A. (1953) Sect~on 76-l-601 defines those terms as follows: 
"(3) "Actor" m2ans a person whose criminal responsi-
bility is in issue in a criminal action ... 
(4) "Person" means an irrlividual, public or private 
corporation, government, partnership, or unin-
corporated association." 
Where the legislature has intended to broaden the meaning 
of a term they have done so expressly in the definitional section. 
An example is the term "person". The legislature has expanded 
the normal meaning of the term to include incorporatlons, partner-
ships and associations. 
Websters New Word Dictionary defines the term "person" as 
follows: 
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The foregoing terms are not normally used in reference to 
an unborn child. 
At common law and in the absence of statute, it is gener-
ally held that the terms "person", "human being", etc. do not 
include an unborn fetus. In order for an infant to be victim 
of a homicide, the child must have heen born alive. 
"At cc:mron law and in the absence of statute, it is the 
rule that if a child dies before birth, no crime is 
predicable of the act causing its death, but if it is 
born alive and thereafter dies from the effects of the 
defendant's felonious act, the culpability is tiE same 
as that in=red in killing any other human being, even 
though the act eventually resulting in its death occured 
before delivery. The element essential to culpability in 
this case seems to be the independant existence of the 
infant. If tiE child can be said to have had an in:iepen-
dant existence, the act of killing, it will be murder or 
mmslaughter; otherwise it will not." 
40 Am Jur 2nd Homicide, p. 300. 
The California Supreme Court confronted the question of 
whether or not the term "human being" as used in the California 
homicide statute included a "viable unborn fetus". In Keeler v. 
Superior Court, 2 Cal 3d 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P 2d 617, 
40 ALR 3d 420, the defendant had beaten his pregnant estranged 
wife in an effort to "stomp the baby out of her". A Caesarian 
section was performed. The fetus was stillborn. The pathologist 
testified that the cause of death was skull fracture from the 
beating of the mother. Further, there was testimony that there 
was "reasonable medical certainty" that the fetus had developed 
to the stage of viability and that if the child had been delivered 
the date of the beating it would have had a 75 to 95 percent on 
-5-
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chance of survival. The court in Keeler (supra) found that 
the term "human being" used in the California statute did not 
include a viable but unborn fetus. The California legislature 
has since passed a feticide statute. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio was presented almost precisely 
the same issue which is presented by the present case in State v. 
Dickenson, 28 Ohio St. 2nd 65, 275 NE 2nd 599. Dickenson was 
charged under the Ohio vehicle homicide statute with causing the 
death of a seven month fetus aborted by the mother as a result 
of injuries sustained during the accident. The fetus was still-
born and an autopsy indicated that death was due to injuries 
sustained as a result of the traffic accident. The section of 
Revised Code of Ohio under which the defendant was charged, 
§ 4511.181 provides in part: 
"No person shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause 
the death of another while violating section 4511.19 
of the Revised Ccx:le. Any person violating this section 
is guilty of hanicide by vehicle in the first degree." 
The court in Dickenson (supra) held that the word "another' 
as used in the Ohio vehicle homicide statute did not include a 
viable fetus upon the ground that the common law had required 
that the child be born alive before it could be the victim of a 
homicide. The court further indicated that the Ohio General 
Assembly had had numerous opportunities to amend the statute but 
had never chosen to expand or change the meaning of the term 
"person" or had never inacted a feticide statute. 
The foregoing cases are not isolated decisions. Many 
courts have found that an unborn viable fetus cannot be the 
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victim of a homicide where the homicide statute uses terms such 
as "human being" or "person" to describe the victim. For example, 
in State v. Gyles (La) 313 So 2nd 799, the court held that where 
defendant struck a pregnant woman which resulted in the delivery 
of a stillborn child he could not be convicted of the statutory 
crime of murder where the statute required the killing of a 
human being. In Kihner v. Hicks (Ariz 1975) 529 p 2d 706, the 
court held that wrongful ~eath statutes providing for damages 
when "death of a person is caused by wrongful act" did not 
include viable fetus. See also Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E. 
2nd 4, and Justiss v. Atchison, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P 2d 122 
(1977). 
The trial court therefore should have granted defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case. 
POINT II 
THE JUDICIAL ENLARGEMENT OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) 
76-5-207 BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTES AN EX POST FACTO LAW 
IN THAT THE DEFENDANT DID HOT RECEIVE FAIR NOTICE OF THE ILLEGAL-
ITY OF HIS CONDUCT. 
Defense counsel moved to dismiss upon the grounds that the 
State failed to prove a prima facie case since Utah Code Annotated 
Section 76-5-207 did not include unborn fetuses (R.74). The 
trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss indicating that the 
question was a jury question in that the death of the fetus should 
be treated the same as if a living person had been killed (R.76,77). 
The court then instructed the jury on the theory tl.~t a fetus 
-7-
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could be the victim of a vehicle homicide. 
Instruction No. 5 provided: 
"The essential elements of the crime charged in the informa-
tion is as follows: 
1. That the defendant while operating an 
automobile on a public street or high-
way killed one, Baby Mlejnek. 
2. That the defendant at such time was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor to a 
degree which rendered him incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle. 
3. That the defendant operated his autaro-
bile in a negligent manner. 
4. That the death of the said Baby Mlejnek was 
the proximate result of the negligence, if 
any, of the defendant. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a 
reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential elements 
of the crime charged, you should acxruit the defendant. But if 
the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable 
doubt all of the elements of the offense as above set forth, 
the defendant is guilty of the offense charged in the Informa-
tion .... " 
Further, Instruct"ion No. 11 provided: 
"The first elC'nu.t of Instruction No. 5 requires that 
you find the del2!1dant killed one Baby r1lejnek. In 
order for you tu do so, you must determine that the 
said Baby MlejJtck was a viable human being. 
"Viability" is defined as having attained such form 
and develop1n11 of organs as would be normally capable 
of living out;;Jde the uterus." 
Defense counsel look exception to both of the foregoing 
instructions (R. 79). 
The findings of til·· lower court that a viable fetus could br 
-8-
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the victim of a homicide constitutes a judicial enlargement of 
U.C.A. Section 76-5-207 which was not forseeable by the defen-
dant. The United States Supreme Court in ~B~o~u~i~e ____ v~·~~C~i~t~y~o~f 
Columbia, (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 12 L Ed 2nd 894, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 
held such judicial enlargements to be "unforseeable" and that the 
retroactive application of a criminal statute so enlarged is a 
denial of due process of law in that the defenoant has no fair 
warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime. See 
also Connaly v. General Construction Co., 269 u.s. 385, 70 LEd 
322, 46 S. Ct. 126. 
Article I, Section 18 of the Utah State Constitution express-
ly forbids the passage of any ex post facto laws. 
Such a judicial enlargement also contravenes Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953) Section 76-1-104 which provides: 
"The provisions of this cxxl.e shall be =nstrued in 
accordance with these general principles: 
(1) Forbid and prevent the emmission of 
offenses; 
(2) Defi,,~ adequately th2 =ncluct and 
ment., L state which constitute each 
offe113e and safeguard conduct that 
is without fault from condemnation 
as c~_Lminal ..... " 
If the provisions and definitions enacted by the legislature 
require additional definition by the judiciary, then it would 
seem to follow that the statute or statutes in question do not 
give the defendant fair notice that his conduct subjected him to 
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POINT III 
ASSUMING THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE BEEN CORRECT IN RULING 
THAT A VIABLE FETUS COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A VEHICLE HOMICIDE, 
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH, IF BELIEVED, 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD HAVE FOUND THE FETUS TO HAVE BEEN VIABLE 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The State's medical expert, Dr. Lynn Dayton, testified on 
direct examination that he assumed the fetus was viable up to 
the point of the accident (R.70). Upon cross-examination he 
stated that by "viability" he meant that the baby was alive 
within the mother (R.70). The doctor indicated that a baby born 
at the stage of development existing at twenty-six weeks of 
gestation statistically does not have a good chance of survival. 
(R.7l). Further, Dr. Dayton estimated the baby's chances of sur-
vival at only twenty-five percent (25%) had the child been born 
under normal circumstances. (R.72). The record contains no 
additional testimony concerning viability of the fetus save that 
of Dr. Dayton. It is difficult to perceive how reasonable minds 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the fetus was viable 
within the confines of Instruction No. ll cited previously. Ther~ 
fore, the conviction of defendant should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
~ 
Appellant submits that the Trial Court should have granted 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss since the Utah State Legislature 
has not included an unborn viable fetus within the class of 
persons who may be victims of homicide. 
Further, that since there arc no statutory definitions 
-10-
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nor cases which have previously defined the conduct of the 
Appellant as criminal, any judicial enlargement of U.C.A. (1953) 
Section 76-5-207 would not give Appellant the fair notice re-
quired by the United States Constitution and the Utah State 
Constitution and would operate as an ex post facto law as 
applied to Appellant. 
Finally, it is respectfully submitted that there was not 
sufficient e\idence of viability upon which reasonable minds 
could find that issue beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Upon such basis, the Appellant seeks reversal of his convic-
tion, or failing that, a new trial. 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
Utah County Legal Defender Assoc. 
107 East 100 South, # 29 
Pro""• UT 84601 
nttorney for Appellant 
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